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Abstract
Since the digital age requires interaction with digital
services, the information security awareness (ISA) of
everyone gets more important than ever. Since the
ISA is defined as a set of aspects, it is not enough
to increase the knowledge. This work focuses on
the aspect of habits. Therefore, we used design
science research to create an artifact which allows the
automated measurement of habits. The automation can
be achieved through a client-server application which
tracks the behavior of employees in a GDPR-compliant
way and calculates multiple metrics based on the
tracked behavior. However, not all of the defined
metrics are applicable in every company. Therefore,
additional process iterations of the design science
research methodology are required.
1. Introduction
The digital age requires increasing interaction with
digital services. Everyday life confronts people
with online banking, online shopping, or the use
of e-government services. The protective measures
brought by the COVID-19 pandemic have intensified
this development. Also, in home office settings,
the working life is increasingly shaped by the use
of the employer’s IT infrastructure. In addition to
the convenience that these digital processes bring
with them, they also increase the requirements for
information security. The manipulation, misuse,
compromising, and willful destruction of data can
have serious legal and economic consequences for
companies. Technical hurdles make it more and more
difficult to attack the technical infrastructure. Therefore,
the human user is increasingly becoming the target of
hackers and is thus an indispensable support for the
defense of sensitive information. Users are confronted
with attacks such as phishing, malware infected e-mails,
or social engineering. On the other site, the study by [1]
proves that people in a certain context contribute more
reliably to information security than technical measures.
In order to prepare employees for their important
role, they have to be aware of information security. The
term information security awareness (ISA) describes
the individual level of awareness of a person [2]. A
person’s ISA is made up of four factors: knowledge
or skills, behavioral intention, salience, and habit [2].
The importance of habit for the behavior of a person in
accordance with information security has so far received
little attention in research. The factor has the side effect
that with a strong habit, the importance of the influence
of the behavioral intention of a person diminishes [3].
In order to give habit the necessary status when
planning measures to increase the ISA, we have to
measure the current degree of development of a habit
for a certain behavior. In practice, methods such
as the Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI) are used for
this purpose. However, the SRHI only relies on the
answers of test subjects themselves. In order to get
a reliable statement about the degree of the habit of
a person, especially with digital behavior, the support
by an automated measurement is a promising option.
The digital behavior of a user can then be monitored
and evaluated. This paper presents the first iteration of
a design science research process for the development
of a software for automated habit measurement. The
software has to be GDPR-compliant in order to record
and evaluate a user’s habits for certain behaviors within
companies [4].
First, we will explain the theoretical background for
our research regarding ISA, habits, and the measuring
of habits in general. Second, we will present our
used methodology and define our research questions.
Afterwards, we will present our design as well as the
implementation of our software tool. Moreover, we will
answer our research questions and discuss the results.
Finally we will give a short summary and an outlook for
future work.






2.1. Information Security Awareness
ISA addresses the human factor and how users can
be sensitized to show information security-compliant
behavior. Targeting users requires less effort for
attackers than technically attacking IT systems by using
methods such as brute-forcing. Therefore, the active
involvement of users is important for the information
security concept of a company. One commonly accepted
method for this involvement is an ISA campaign.
Campaigns aim for motivating users to use their
theoretical knowledge about information security in
practice [5] and for convincing them of the importance
of their actions.
To explain human behavior we use the Integrated
Behavioral Model (IBM) [6]. The IBM was already
interpreted in the context of ISA and used to explain the
mental construct ISA [2]. Based on that, we used the
IBM to interpret the findings of our analysis and draw
initial conclusions for suitable ISA measures. The ISA
of a person is the sum of the four factors knowledge
and skills (“I know how the behavior is performed”),
habit (“I’m used to perform the behavior”), salience
(“The performance of the behavior is in my mind”), and
behavioral intention (“I want to perform the behavior”).
Especially the factor behavioral intention is complex
and formed by the three mental constructs attitude,
perceived norm, and personal agency of a person. These,
in turn, are formed by emotions and beliefs.
The four indicated factors must be influenced to
convince a user to behave compliant with information
security policies. But even then, environmental
constraints can still prevent the performance of the
behavior. This shows that a person’s environment is
also significantly involved in shaping their behavior.
In addition, the influence of environmental factors
can also affect the behavioral intention [6]. In
companies these environmental factors are shaped by the
organization (e.g., the existence of policies, usability of
services). This is also confirmed for ISA by [7], who
name organization as an additional aspect of security
awareness. The organization ensures that employees
are able to behave in compliance with information
security, i.e., no barriers exist, which are in conflict
with compliant behavior. For example, a barrier is a
password change link which is hidden in the depths of
the intranet. At the same time, organizational measures,
such as increasing the usability of an application, may
support information security.
2.2. Habits
A habit is a learned sequence of actions that have
become automatic responses to certain triggers [8].
Habits usually have the following characteristics: They
are activated unconsciously, are difficult to control and
are mentally efficient, so that other activities can be
carried out in parallel [9].
The more often a behavior is carried out, the stronger
the habit becomes [3]. For the establishment of a habit,
however, it is important that satisfactory consequences
result from the implementation of the behavior [10].
The emergence of a habit is usually the result of an
initially intentional act [10], but from time to time this
act is no longer carried out due to the motivation to
achieve a goal. Rather, it is carried out by cues and
henceforth cause the execution [11]. A distinction is
made between “specific times, locations, moods and
interaction partners” as four different groups of cues
[12].
With increasing habit, the influence of the behavioral
intention on the execution of the behavior decreases
[3]. Because of the lesser influence of the factors
that make up the behavioral intention, the process of
executing a behavior is less complex. Locking the
computer when leaving the work place is an example
of a common activity. After it has been executed a few
times, the employee will unconsciously do this as soon
as they leave the workplace without worrying about the
execution. So the behavior became a habit. However,
habit is not equally relevant for all behaviors. Behaviors
that are performed less often, such as reporting a
security incident, do not simply become a habit due to
the lack of repetition. If the employee notices a security
incident, they will probably first think about what to do.
The strength of a habit is usually measured by
how often a behavior was carried out in the past [12].
The most commonly used approach to measuring habit
strength is the Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI) [13]
from [14]. The SRHI consists of a qualitative survey.
The test object evaluates twelve statements using a five-
or multi-point Likert scale, with the value 1 for “I
disagree” and the value 5 for “I agree”. Questions are
asked about the regular repetition of behavior in the
past, unconscious triggering or identification with the
corresponding behavior. The result is then calculated
in relation to the total number of points. According to
[15] a value below 25% is considered to be a low habit
strength, from 26% to 82% as a medium habit strength
and above 83% as a high strength of habit.
With its qualitative character the SRHI can help
to generate hypotheses about habits regarding the
information security related behavior of a person.
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However, the hypotheses are based on the statements
of the test subjects. According to [16] the social
desirability bias (SDB) is especially critical [17]
regarding ISA. Fertig et al. state that the subjects could
give answers which are more favorably viewed by others
instead of the truth. The hypotheses generated with
the SRHI can be validated with an additional automated
measuring system. Thereby discrepancies to the actual
behavior can be detected. The actual measurement of
the execution of a behavior corresponds to the definition
of Ji und Wood [12].
3. Methodology and Research Questions
Our research is based on the Design Science
Research Methodology from Peffers et al. [18].
Therefore, we identified a problem first. We conducted
two systematic literature reviews and interviewed a total
of six experts of the industry to gather the requirements
[reference omitted due to blind review]. The literature
revealed a lack of information regarding the measuring
of ISA as well as the considering of habits regarding ISA
of employees. Moreover, the interviews with the experts
revealed that one possible reason for the lack, is the
challenge in the quantification of human behavior. This
is why often only metrics about the number of trained
employees are used for ISA [19].
The problem identification revealed requirements
for metrics which are identical in literature as
well as in practice: metrics should be meaningful,
practice-oriented, fast and easy to handle, as well as
individual. However, the experts added additional
requirements: automation, anonymity, and extensive
documentation [reference omitted due to blind review].
Therefore, we derived the following objectives
for our artifact: Our artifact has to allow us the
definition of metrics which fulfill the aforementioned
criteria. Moreover, the artifact has to gather the metrics
automatically in order to allow them to be fast and
easy to handle. The anonymity is required to be
GDPR-compliant and is, therefore, also an objective for
our artifact.
The requirements and objectives have been
translated into the following research questions:
RQ1) How can habits be measured in the context of
ISA?
RQ2) Can the measuring of habits be automated?
RQ3) If an automation is possible, can it be
GDPR-compliant?
4. Concept for Automated Measuring
Since literature shows the use of SRHI for
manual measuring of habits, we analyzed the default
questionnaire to check for possibilities for automation.
The items ... I do frequently, ... that belongs to my
(daily, weekly, monthly) routine, and ... I have been
doing for a long time are focusing on the history of
behavioral repetition. Since our software will track the
behavior of employees, those items of the SRHI are
possible to automate. Therefore, the results of the SRHI
questionnaire could easily be compared to the results of
the tracking tool.
This section summarizes the design of our artifact
according to the methodology of Peffers et al. [18]. At
first, we will define some metrics which can be used by
our software to measure habits. Then, we will explain
the derivable habits which our artifact will measure
automatically. Finally, we will discuss how random
behavioral patterns can be detected by our measuring
tool.
4.1. Metrics for Automated Measuring
In this section, we describe our defined metrics.
They are summarized in Table 1. We also provide the
references as well as decisions which led to each metric.
Since it is not allowed to track the complete behavior
of an employee, we reduced the logging to only the
security-relevant behaviors.
Using the same password over a longer period of
time involves certain risks. Therefore, some institutions
rely on expiring passwords, which must be changed
after a certain number of days. However, this leads to
consecutive passwords, which contain, for example, a
number that is incremented with each forced change. It
is also not uncommon for this measure to simply add the
current month to the end of the password. However, to
recognize passwords that are too old and to determine
the frequency of password changes, the timestamps of
the latest password change should be recorded [20].
Removable storage devices pose a massive threat to
companies [21]. Removable storage devices include
simple usb devices, external hard drives and memory
cards, but also CD-ROMs or floppy disks. As part
of a study, employees from the University of Illinois
deposited 297 usb devices on their university campus.
The first usb device was connected to a computer
in less than six minutes. The experimental setup of
the study led to a success rate of up to 98% [22].
Had this attack been carried out in a real scenario
by a malicious attacker, this would result in fatal
consequences. Usb devices can act as HID interfaces
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with appropriate modifications. A usb devices pretends
to be a keyboard, which simulates user input through
previous programming. This opens a command line in
a matter of seconds and can, for example, open a TCP
connection to the attacker’s server. The attacker receives
full control over the computer. From there they can
spread their attack on the local network. If the attacker
has already advanced to this stage of his attack, they
can now steal sensitive data or cause massive damage.
Therefore, monitoring the connection of the devices to
the computers is advisable. If a removable medium is
connected contrary to the policies, this must be logged
[23].
In addition to the monitoring of removable storage
devices, the data transfer should also be monitored. A
well-known reason is the example of the whistleblower
Edward Snowden. He stole security-critical documents
unnoticed from an NSA facility in Hawaii with the help
of a usb device [24]. Therefore, it should be logged
if sensitive data is transferred to removable storage
devices.
Since drive-by downloads can happen during web
browsing, an unconscious infection of systems with
malware can happen. In addition, corporate data can
get into private hands via offers such as web mail,
cloud-based file sharing services, or FTP servers. As a
consequence, it is advisable to record improper access to
blacklisted domains or to potentially dangerous domains
[20, 25].
If employees in companies do not lock their
screen when leaving the workplace, this behavior
enables unauthorized third parties to cause damage
from the employee’s computer. This primarily harms
the company itself and ultimately falls back on the
employee as it gives the impression that they caused
the damage from their computer. Therefore, employees
should always lock their screen when they leave their
workplace. Even the short period of time it takes to get
coffee is enough for an attacker to cause damage from
the unlocked computer. For this reason, it makes sense
that the idle time of the user is also logged, i.e., the time
in which no keyboard inputs or mouse movements are
made. If a user does not enter any data for a predefined
period of time, it can be assumed that they have left his
workplace. If this is the case and the computer has not
been locked, this can be assessed as a policy violation
which must be logged [20].
The most widely used operating system in offices,
Windows 10, receives two new versions per year [26].
If an employee prevents operating system updates they
present themselves to potential attackers as a simple
target due to the contained and known uncertainties.
From this it can be concluded that our tool should check
the current Windows version against the supported
version. Any mismatch must be logged.
The software installed on a computer and their
respective versions have an impact on the security of a
computer. In particular, common applications are often
the focus of attackers, as they offer a simple attack
vector. For example, program codes can be executed
via prepared PDF documents in Adobe Reader versions
that have not yet been patched [27]. Therefore, all
program installations must be verified, the installation
of prohibited software or the use of a program version
that is no longer supported must be logged [20].
4.2. Derivable Habits
The characteristics of habits queried in the SRHI
are: the regular repetition of behavior in the past; the
difficult controllability; the unconscious release; and
mental performance efficiency. First of all, it is now
crucial which behavior patterns can be measured with
regard to their habitualization.
Compliance with password regulations initially
seems difficult to measure in terms of habit. It is obvious
that different companies handle the composition of the
password from upper and lower case letters, numbers
and special characters differently. In addition, it is also
a matter of the fact that passwords should not be passed
on when absent - not even to your own colleagues.
However, should this happen contrary to the password
policies, this will probably rarely be the case. A check of
this behavior with the SRHI can produce rather useless
results. Moreover, since the change of passwords will
not happen very often it cannot be defined as a habit.
Therefore, we can measure the metric for password
changes but cannot derive a valid habit from it.
The removal of suspicious e-mails would initially
also be a behavior which, due to the irregular execution,
is rather difficult to habitualize. However, a distinction
must be made between the process of optical analysis
of the e-mails by a user and the actual removal. Not
every e-mail has to be removed automatically - but
every incoming e-mail should first be checked visually
for indicators of malicious content or attachments or
phishing. The removal or reporting of potentially
harmful e-mails is then only the follow-up activity.
Countless e-mails land in the mailboxes of companies
every day and many employees come into contact with
them. Every new e-mail could be a potentially harmful
e-mail. It is therefore important that they check their
e-mails before they open unknown attachments or an
attacker can access user data via a phishing page. In the
event of suspicion, the users inform the IT help desk so
that it can react accordingly and issue a company-wide
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Table 1. Summary of Metrics for the Derivation of Habits
ID Metric Description
1 Latest password change The timestamp of the latest password change.
2 Connection of usb devices Logs whether external usb devices have been connected.
3 Data transfer to usb devices Logs whether files have been transferred to external usb devices.
4 Access to suspicious domains Logs if a suspicious or blacklisted URL has been accessed.
5 Screen Locking The timestamps when the screen is locked.
6 Idle Time The timestamps when the PC switches in idle state.
7 Information of Operating System Information about Operating System changes, version, build number, etc.
8 Installed Software Versions Logs Software versions and Software which is not whitelisted.
warning. In this way, the security awareness of the other
employees can be increased and the correct reaction
to the e-mail can be made. Only the frequent and
regular implementation of the analysis of e-mails can
be habitualized and can therefore also be measured with
the SRHI. However, our metric regarding the access
to suspicious domains can give a clue if an employee
follows links in e-mails. Nevertheless, the analysis of
e-mails cannot be totally measured by software.
Another behavior that is carried out quite often and
is also subject to a certain regularity, is the screen
locking. Users should always lock their screen when
leaving their workplace. A look at everyday office
life shows how often this is the case. Depending on
their position in the company, employees may be out
and about within the building more often, they may
leave their workplace for a coffee or lunch break, to
go to the toilet or for team meetings in seminar rooms.
The most varied of constellations are conceivable - an
unlocked screen offers the possibility of attack at any
time. In Windows, the screen lock can be set quickly
and easily using the Windows key + L shortcut. It is a
simple key combination that can provide more security
when leaving the workplace. As a rule, this is repeated
regularly and frequently. A habit can definitely be
established for this. The measurement for this behavior
can be carried out with the SRHI. Moreover, the habit
can also be measured automatically via software based
on the metrics for screen locking and idle time. In
contrast to the SRHI a software-based solution would
also recognize idle times with unlocked screens.
At first glance, the use of removable storage devices
is a behavior that cannot be measured in connection
with habits. As already mentioned usb devices are a
popular means of spreading malware, so their use should
be avoided completely in the best case. Therefore, the
desired behavior should rather be the avoidance of usb
devices. Alternatively, certain places on network drives
or the cloud can be used for the daily exchange of data
between employees. If the required infrastructure is
available, users can access it. Over a certain period of
time, the data exchange can be habitualized via network
drive or cloud. This behavior, on the other hand, can in
turn be measured with the SRHI. The usb devices can
be replaced in a certain way for data exchange. The
security risk can thus be further minimized. Moreover,
both metrics for connecting and transferring data to
removable storage devices can be used to automatically
measure this behavior.
In addition, updating the computer is another
behavior that can be established in connection with a
habit and can therefore be measured with the SRHI.
Simply shutting down the computer after work and
starting it the next morning can be such a habit.
The computer installs updates automatically when it
is shut down. Known vulnerabilities are thus usually
closed. Shutting down the computer in the afternoon
or evening can be established through a habit, which
is then automatically triggered. A measurement of this
behavior via a questionnaire and the SRHI is possible.
Since a software can track the operating system version
an automated measurement would be possible.
To sum up, we can easily derive the habits regarding
screen locking, the avoidance of removable storage
devices, as well as installing updates of the operating
system. Even updates for other applications can easily
be measured automatically. However, there exist many
more security-related habits, which have to be analyzed
regarding automation.
4.3. Habitualized Behavior Patterns
Since our software logs many behaviors of
employees an analysis of the date can uncover
habitualized behavioral patterns. Those patterns can
then be used for targeted ISA trainings. On the one
hand, an employee can have established habits that are
compliant with the security policies. On the other hand,
an employee can also be not compliant. Either way it
is important for the employee to know and realize their
habitualized behavior patterns.
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Using artificial Intelligence (AI) was one idea for the
analysis of the logged data. Since pattern recognition
can be done with supervised or unsupervised learning
we did not consider reinforcement learning approaches
[28].
The first approach is to collect a large data set of
productive data and let an AI automatically recognize
patterns with unsupervised learning. The advantage of
this approach is that the AI recognizes patterns that a
human might overlook or cannot see at all. The second
approach of supervised learning must be preceded by a
manual data analysis. This sample data must be marked
as a recognized pattern for training the AI.
However, since every employee has different
behavioral patterns it is difficult to create patterns for
supervised learning. Moreover, since unsupervised
learning requires a large amount of data, the software
would have to track the behavior of the employee for
a long time period. Therefore, we decided against
AI to uncover behavioral patterns and implemented a
traditional algorithm instead.
The algorithm is intended to analyze the behavior
metrics that are repeated on a daily basis. If a certain
behavior occurs almost every day at a similar time,
the algorithm should calculate the mean value of the
behavior occurrence within the respective best time
window. If a behavior occurs more frequently during
the working days, the behavior could be considered as a
habit.
The algorithm also checks behavior patterns which
repeat every week. Behavioral patterns previously
identified as daily habits should not be used to analyze
weekly habits. If a certain behavior pattern occurs at a
similar time of the week, the algorithm should calculate
the respective best time window.
4.4. Software Design of the Tracking Tool
Since we have to implement a software solution
which is compliant with the GDPR, we used a client
server architecture. The client gathers the personal
behavior information. The server only stores aggregated
and anonymized data. Therefore, the server supports
a dashboard which shows the aggregated numbers
and metrics. However, it is not possible to receive
information about a specific employee.
The client stores the personal behavior information
only for the duration of behavior pattern detection. As
soon as the patterns are recognized the detailed data is
no longer required and will be deleted from the client.
An employee can enforce the deletion of the gathered
data at any time.
In future work the goal is to also train employees
via the client. Therefore, the client should notify the
employee about behavioral patterns so that the employee
can actively try to avoid them. In order to allow
the future improvement of our software we required a
modular software which can easily be extended.
During our first iteration we only focused on
Windows as an operating system. However, additional
operating systems are also relevant. This is why we
used python as a programming language. Furthermore,
Python allows to easily use terminal commands.
Since Python also supports the development of web
applications, we could easily implement a frontend for
the dashboard.
5. Implementation
This section describes the development of our
artifact according to the methodology of Peffers et
al. [18]. For the implementation of our software
we used Python to easily roll out the prototype for
different operating systems. However, in the first
iteration we solely focused on Windows since it is
often used in companies. In the following we give a
short summary how each metric defined in Section 4.1
could be implemented under Windows using Python.
Nevertheless, since we are using very context-specific
solutions which could not be retrieved from literature,
we are referencing web postings instead.
The last password change can easily be determined
under Windows using the command net user.
The command provides some information about the
parameterized user name, including the date including
the time of the last password change. Therefore,
the current user name has to be determined. This
functionality is already natively integrated in Python via
the call os.getlogin(). In addition, the command
can be expanded to also include the domain parameter.
This is usually required if the current user is not a
local Windows user and is instead logged on via a
company domain [29]. The time of the last password
change can be determined from the command line
output. Finally, the date must be checked against the
company’s minimum time requirements. If the date of
the last change is older than allowed, this incident will
be logged.
The connection of removable usb devices can only
be responded to directly under Linux with the help
of udev-based libraries. No adequate solution can be
found for Windows. Instead, Python can poll the WMI
library to check which logical drives are connected to a
computer and whether they are of the RemovableMedia
type [30]. Only the drive letter, its size and the file
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Figure 1. Dashboard for Assessment of Metrics
system used can be determined. For a better assignment,
the name of the hardware is also interesting. In Windows
this is called the FriendlyName. In order to be
able to deduce the friendly name from a drive letter,
several internal Windows databases must be queried.
All FriendlyNames per connected device are noted
in the table Win32 DiskDrive. In order to be
able to infer the device used based on the drive letter,
several tables must be linked with one another. On the
one hand Win32 DiskDriveToDiskPartition,
which links devices and partitions. On the other
hand, Win32 LogicalDiskToPartition, which
contains the drive letters of the partitions [31]. The
combined data can be logged when a new removable
medium is recognized.
Data transfers to removable usb devices are
monitored. A common technique for this are
so-called watchdogs on the file system. These trigger
corresponding events for all file system operations,
which can be conveniently handled. A watchdog
functionality is built into most programming languages;
this is also the case with Python. By recognizing
the connection of a removable usb device, a separate
watchdog can be generated for each device. Copying a
file to a medium triggers the event on created, which
contains the file name as a parameter [32].
Tracking domain access of suspecious websites can
be achieved by reading the local DNS cache of a
Windows computer. To increase the performance of
domain resolutions, Windows has its own internal DNS
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cache. Domain names that have already been resolved
are stored here with their assigned IP address in order
to prevent the DNS from being queried in a short time.
Using the command ipconfig, useful information can
be read out via the network interface in Windows [33].
With the appropriate parameterization the command
displaydns can read from the Windows-internal
DNS cache.
The metrics screen locking, screen saver and idle
time are related to each other: Both the activation
of the screen saver and the locking of a computer
can be easily tracked by low-level Windows APIs.
Python can listen to internal system events of COM
interfaces via ctypes [34]. The program interfaces
used are unfortunately operating system-specific for
Windows, but absolutely reliable. These events are then
automatically logged. Exceeding the idle time, on the
other hand, cannot be tracked via events. Instead, the
library pywin32 is used to periodically check how
long ago the last user interaction with the computer was
[35]. If the determined value exceeds the configurable
limit value, this incident will be logged. The library
pywin32 can also be used to check whether the lock
screen is currently active [36].
To track the version of the operating system, some
commands and APIs for reading out the version
number were viewed and compared [37]. Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI) turned out to be
a positive result. WMI is one of the Win32 APIs and
provides a command line interface for administration
via CMD (WMIC) [38]. WMIC offers a query of
different services with flexible parameterization. The
command wmic os get is required to read the
version information. All incidents will be logged if
undesired operating system information or versions are
detected.
The software versions and the installed software
itself also represent critical metrics that need to be
tracked. The WMIC is also used to determine
those metrics. In this case, however, a different
parameterization is required than for the operating
system version. The specific command for reading out
the software information is therefore: wmic product
get name, version [39]. The resulting output
shows the name of the installed software and its
version numbers in a two-column table. This table can
then be checked against a list of prohibited software
and permitted minimum versions of installed software.
Incidents are again logged.
In addition to the implementation of the logging
mechanism and the gathering of metrics, we
implemented a dashboard for the assessment of
metrics. Figure 1 shows the dashboard. Filtering based
on metric category or time ar possible. The same
dashboard can be used to configure the priorities as well
as allowed software versions.
6. Results Discussion
We based our research on the design science research
methodology proposed by Peffers et al. [18]. We
started by identifying a problem which lies in the nature
of human behavior: it is difficult to quantify. Then,
we gathered the requirements for the measurement of
habits as one factor of the ISA of employees. The
most important requirement for the experts was the
automation. Therefore, we defined our objectives
regarding the automated measuring of habits.
In Section 4 and Section 5 we summarized our
design and development phase. The resulting artifact
can now be used to answer our research questions.
RQ1 focuses on the measuring of habits in the
context of ISA. Since the SRHI is the de facto standard
questionnaire to measure habits, it is possible to create
such questionnaires with security-compliant behaviors.
However, the answers of the employees could differ
from their actual behavior. This is why software
based behavior tracking is a proposing alternative.
Consequently, we defined metrics which can be used to
track some security related behaviors. The measurement
results can be used to get an idea about established
habits of the user. However, it is difficult to decide
whether a behavior is a habit solely by tracking it via
software. Therefore, we recommend to combine the
software tracking with interviews or questionnaires to
determine if the actual behavior represents a habit.
RQ2 focuses on the automated measurements. Since
we use a software to track the behavior of employees,
it is possible to fully automate the retrieval of metrics.
However, it is not possible to automatically decide
whether a certain behavior represents a habit. This is due
to the complexity of habits. The combination of metrics
can lead to assumptions about habits, but one metric
alone cannot be used to decide whether an employee
has a habit. For example, the metric for screen locking
cannot be used isolated to decide if the employee has
the habit to lock their screen. Additional information
is required: maybe the employee has turned on the
auto-lock after a certain idle time. This is why the metric
for idle times has to be considered as well. If on the
one hand no incident regarding the idle time is recorded,
but the screens have been locked, we could assume the
employee has the habit to lock their screen.
RQ3 focuses on privacy aspects of our software
artifact. We implemented several functionalities to
ensure privacy: We aggregated the metrics on the server
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without any possibility to get information about the
actual employee causing the numbers. The client keeps
the data as short as possible so that an attack on an
employee’s computer cannot reveal all of the tracked
behavior. Of course some additional permissions will be
required in different companies. Nevertheless, we argue
that an GDPR-compliant automation is possible.
After the development of our artifact, we reached
out to companies to start the demonstration process of
Peffers et al. [18]. Overall the companies liked the
idea and wanted to conduct a piloting project. We will
use the pilots for an extended evaluation of our artifact.
However, we already received some feedback, which we
will use as a possible research entry point for our future
work.
Our metrics cannot be used for every employee
identically: Some employees do not have administrator
privileges on their computers which renders the metrics
for operating system version and software versions
useless. Those metrics can only be useful in companies
which do not have centralized patch managements or
for employees with administrator privileges. Moreover,
some companies may use watchguards or strong
firewalls which will block the access to suspicious
domains. However, even if the access was blocked it
could be interesting to have a metric representing the
access attempts.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we summarized our process iteration
for the development of an artifact for automated
measurement of habits in the context of ISA. Therefore,
we used the design science research methodology
proposed by Peffers et al. [18]. In the concept
we presented our design for the software which
consists of the definition of metrics, the derivation
of security-relevant habits as well as the recognition
of additional behavioral patterns. Moreover, we
summarized the architecture of our software tool.
Afterwards, we explained how every metric can be
measured under Windows.
Since our prototype has only been evaluated by the
presentation to experts of companies, we will carry
out a large-scale evaluation in the next steps of our
research. Therefore, we will install the prototype
within different companies and will track the behavior
of employees. In parallel, the companies will sensitize
their employees for ISA. In an ideal world, the metrics
will then improve due to the ISA trainings. During and
after the evaluation project, we will gather feedback to
improve the prototype within the next process iteration.
During the evaluation, we will also continue the
development of the software to enable the use on
additional operating systems. Moreover, we will
implement additional features for the sensitization of
employees based on their locally tracked behavior.
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[2] A. E. Schütz, “Information security awareness: It’s
time to change minds!,” in Proceedings of International
Conference on Applied Informatics Imagination,
Creativity, Design, Development - ICDD 2018, 2018.
[3] H. C. Triandis, Interpersonal behavior. Monterey Calif.:
Brooks/Cole, 1977.
[4] E. Parliament, “General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) – Official Legal Text.” https://gdpr-info.eu/,
2016. Last accessed: 2021-06-15.
[5] M. Bada and A. Sasse, “Cyber Security Awareness
Campaigns: Why do they fail to change behaviour?,”
July 2014. Num Pages: 38 Place: Oxford, UK Publisher:
Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, University of
Oxford.
[6] D. E. Montaño and D. Kasprzyk, “Theory of Reasoned
Action, Theory of Planned Behavior, and the Integrated
Behavioral Model,” in Health Behavior and Health
Education. Theory, Research and Practice. 4th Edition
(K. Glanz, B. K. Rimer, and K. Viswanath, eds.),
pp. 67–96, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2008.
[7] L. Hirshfield, P. Bobko, A. J. Barelka, M. R. Costa,
G. J. Funke, V. F. Mancuso, V. Finomore, and B. A.
Knott, “The Role of Human Operators’ Suspicion in the
Detection of Cyber Attacks:,” International Journal of
Cyber Warfare and Terrorism, vol. 5, pp. 28–44, July
2015.
[8] B. Verplanken and H. Aarts, “Habit, Attitude, and
Planned Behaviour: Is Habit an Empty Construct or
an Interesting Case of Goal-directed Automaticity?,”
European Review of Social Psychology, vol. 10, no. 1,
pp. 101–134, 1999. Number: 1.
[9] B. Verplanken, “Beyond frequency: Habit as mental
construct,” British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 45,
pp. 639–656, Sept. 2006.
[10] H. Aarts and A. Dijksterhuis, “Habits as knowledge
structures: Automaticity in goal-directed behavior,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 78,
no. 1, pp. 53–63, 2000. Number: 1.
[11] W. Wood, L. Tam, and M. G. Witt, “Changing
Circumstances, Disrupting Habits,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 88, no. 6,
pp. 918–933, 2005. Number: 6.
[12] M. F. Ji and W. Wood, “Purchase and Consumption
Habits: Not Necessarily What You Intend,” Journal of
Consumer Psychology, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 261–276, 2007.
Number: 4.
Page 7710
[13] B. Gardner, “A review and analysis of the use of
‘habit’ in understanding, predicting and influencing
health-related behaviour,” Health Psychology Review,
vol. 9, pp. 277–295, Aug. 2015.
[14] B. Verplanken and S. Orbell, “Reflections on Past
Behavior: A Self-Report Index of Habit Strength,”
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, no. 33,
pp. 1313–1330, 2003.
[15] R. J. H. van Bree, M. M. van Stralen, C. Bolman, A. N.
Mudde, H. de Vries, and L. Lechner, “Habit as moderator
of the intention-physical activity relationship in older
adults: a longitudinal study,” Psychology & Health,
vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 514–532, 2013.
[16] T. Fertig and A. Schütz, “About the Measuring
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